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"Reduced to its simplest form the
problem is nothing else than this:
We want to keep South Africa White
. . .'keeping it White' can only
mean one thing, namely White domina-
tion) not 'leadership, ' not "guidance,'
but "control, ' "supremacy. "
Hendrik Verwoerd: former
Prime Minister of the Republic
of South Africa I
"We are looking forward to a nonracial,
just and egalitarian society in which
colour creed and race shall form no
point of reference."
Stephen Biko: founder of the
Black Consciousness Movement2
The Republic of South Africa is a rigidly stratified
pigmentocracy where whites occupy the top of the social
pyramid while blacks are pinned to the bottom.3 What dis-
t A.B. 1977, Princeton University; J.D, candidate, Yale Law
School. Mr. Kennedy is'a frequent contributor to The New Republic.
1. Reply of Ethiopia and Liberia, 4 South West Africa Cases,
I.C.J. Pleadings 220, 264 (1966) (quoting South African Parliamentary
Debates 2d Parl. 2d Sess. 1963), quoted in M. McDougal, H. Lasswell &
L. Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order 529 n.433 (1980).
2. S. Biko, Black Consciousness in South Africa at v (M. Arnold
ed. 1979).
3. According to apartheid's strict racial hierarchy, whites
(also popularly referred to as Europeans) occupy the first rank, fol-
lowed by "coloureds,"--persons of mixed racial parentage where the mix-
ture includes white blood--Asians, and Africans. The nature of South
Africa's racial conflict is submerging differences separating groups
oppressed by white domination. Coloureds and Asians are increasingly
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tinguishes the South African situation from racial dis-
crimination elsewhere is that it reflects official gov-
ernment policy. The Republic of South Africa is the
only government in the world that makes racial domina-
tion the foundation of its philosophy and racial separa-
tion the basis of its conduct. 4 The Afrikaaner regime
coined the term "apartheid" to describe its vision of
social organization. It is a term so associated with
calculated cruelty that in many quarters of the inter-
national community apartheid has superseded nazism as
the exemplar of state-organized terrorism. As the
United Nations has repeatedly declared, apartheid is "a
crime against humanity.''5
In Human Rights and the South African Legal Order ,
6
John Dugard presents a comprehensive analysis of the laws
of apartheid. Blacks are the group most victimized by
these laws. An encyclopedic array of controls clamp nar-
row restrictions upon practically every aspect of their
lives. Job reservation laws restrict blacks from per-
forming many kinds of skilled and semi-skilled jobs--
"civilized labour"--and permit them to staff only the un-
desirable, lower-paying positions--"uncivilized labour."
Moreover, as Dugard notes, "there is an unwritten law
that no white employee shall be subordinate to a black....,,7
Education for blacks is separate and unequal; on the aver-
age the government annually spends 654 Rand for each white
child but only 49 Rand for each black.8 Blacks are prohi-
3. (Continued)
referring to themselves as blacks, aligning themselves with the most
numerous and most oppressed group, the black Africans. For the pur-
poses of this review, however, black is used only to describe Afri-
cans. The South African population numbers an estimated 37 million:
191 million black, 41 million white, 21Z million coloured, 765,000
Asian. South African Institute of Race Relations, Survey of Race Re-
lations in South Africa 1978, at 49 (1979).
4. M. Moskowitz, The Politics and Dynamics of Human Rights 177
(1968).
5. See, e.g., 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 38, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974). See also M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & L, Chen, supra note 1,
at 535 n.467 (enumerating more complete list of U.N. condemnations of
apartheid).
6. J. Dugard, Human Rights and the South African Legal Order
(1978) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
7. P. 86.
8. Figures quoted are for 1976-77. See South African Institute
of Race Relations, supra note 3, at 39.9. One Rand is currently equiva-
lent to 1.3 United States dollars.
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bited from buying land outside "homelands" set aside for
them by the government. Although blacks constitute seven-
ty percent of the population, the homelands constitute
only thirteen percent of South Africa's territory. Lands
outside the homelands that are owned by Africans are
labelled "black spots" and subject to government expro-
priation. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Africans,
described officially as "surplus population," have been
forcibly resettled in or near the homelands, land that is
generally of poor quality and far removed from sources of
employment. Statutes restrict the rights of blacks to
travel within South Africa. Except in certain narrowly
defined circumstances, it is a crime for an African to
remain in an urban area for longer than seventy-two hours
unless he has been issued a permit. But even an African
who qualifies for legal residence within an -rban area is
not entitled under law to move freely within it, In 1977
the State President imposed curfews in over 300 cities and
towns prohibiting Africans from being in any public place
during specified hours at night. And the Minister of
Bantu Administration and Development is given wide powers
to forbid blacks from attending churches, hospitals, or
places of entertainment outside African residential areas
whenever, in his opinion, "the presence of Bantu ... is
causing a nuisance to residents in the vicinity of those
premises."9
These and other humiliating deprivations are imposed
by a parliamentary regime totally closed to black parti-
cipation. South African law denies the vote to blacks,
and in 1968 Parliament proscribed multi-racial political
parties.10 Under this statute no person belonging to one
racial group may join a political organization of which a
person belonging to another racial group is a member, or
address a meeting of persons of whom the majority belong
to any other racial group in order to further the interests
of a political organization. To further undermine the
potential for any semblance of organized black political
power the government has banned every significant black
opposition party--from the African National Congress and
the Pan Africanist Congress in 1960 to the South African
Organization and the Black Peoples Convention in 1977.
9. Pp. 74-75.
10. Prohibition of Political Interference Act, Act 51 of 1968,
Statutes of the Republic of South Africa (1968).
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To protect apartheid the South African government
has enacted statutes to repress dissent. Salient features
of these laws include vagueness and the delegation of
virtually unlimited authority to officials in the execu-
tive branch. To take but two examples: The Internal
Security Actll prohibits the advocacy of communism and
its objects and was extended in 1976 to cover organiza-
tions and individuals who engage in "activities which
endanger the security of the state or the maintenance of
public order."12 Under the Terrorism Actl3 a person
commits the capital crime of "participation in terroris-
tic activities" if, "with intent to endanger the main-
tenance of law and order in the Republic, he commits any
act in the Republic or elsewhere"l4 that had or was likely
to have any of a long list of effects mentioned by the
statute. Among these effects are those likely:
(a) to hamper or to deter any person from
assisting in the maintenance of law and
order;
(b) to promote, by intimidation, the
achievement of any object;
Cc) to cause or promote general dislocation,
disturbance or disorder;
(h) to cause substantial financial loss to
any person or the State;
(i) to cause, encourage or further feelings of
hostility between the White and other in-
habitants of the Republic;
(1) to embarrass the administration of the affairs
of the State.15
11. Internal Security Amendment Act 79 of 1976, amending Section
2(2) of Act 44 of 1950, Statutes of the Republic of South Africa (1976).
See p. 155.
12. Id.
13. Terrorism Act, Section 2 of Act No. 83 of 1967, Statutes of
the Republic of South Africa (1967) [hereinafter cited as Terrorism Act].
14. Pp. 262-63 (emphasis in original) quoting Terrorism Act, supra
note 13, at § 2(l)(a), (b).
15. Terrorism Act, supra note 13, at § 2(2)(a), (b), (c), (h), (i),
(1) quoted at p. 263.
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Under the security laws, dissidents can be detained
and punished by executive action with little or no judi-
cial oversight. Under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act,
any senior police officer may order the arrest of a
suspected "terrorist" or anyone suspected of withholding
any information relating to "terrorists." A suspect may
be detained indefinitely without trial or any other judi-
cial restraint and may be interrogated in solitary
confinement. The possibilities for using this law as a
cover, indeed a sanction, for torture is suggested by the
statute's own chilling words: the police may order a sus-
pect's release "when satisfied that he has satisfactorily
replied to all questions at the said interrogation or that
no useful purpose will be served by his further detention."16
It should be remembered that Stephen Biko, leader of the
Black Consciousness Movement, died of brain damage in 1977
while in police custody under Section 6. Similarly useful
as a legal tool of repression is Section 10 of the Internal
Security Act. Under this provision the Minister of Justice
can issue a "banning order" against someone if the Minister
is satisfied that that person is violating the provisions
of the Act. Banning orders usually confine the person to a
particular area, typically a magisterial district, though
some banning orders restrict the person to her home and
prohibit the banned person from receiving visitors.
Vague, broadly phrased legislation that ousts judi-
cial oversight of important restrictions on individual
rights and liberties is immune to judicial testing. Parli-
amentary sovereignty is embedded in the Republic's Consti-
tution: "No court of law shall be competent to enquire
into or to pronounce upon the validity of any Act passed by
Parliament.... ,,17 As a result, Dugard notes, "Parliament
has been able to run roughshod over individual liberty with-
out fear of judicial obstruction."1 8 The courts, deeply
imbued with a rigidly positivistic legal philosophy, have
generally affirmed Parliament's power no matter how des-
tructive of human rights legislation has become. In the
words of one court, "Parliament may make any encroachment
it chooses upon the life, liberty or property of any indi-
vidual subject to its sway, and ... it is the function of
courts of law to enforce its will.",19
16. Pp. 117-18.
17. S. Afr. Const., Section 59(2) of Act No. 32 of 1961, quoted
at p. 35. Section 59(2) limits judicial review to cases involving
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Along with his description of apartheid's legal
apparatus, Dugard offers suggestions for reform. In a
"Plea for a New Approach to Law" he complains that
"[p]ositivism has not served South Africa well as a
guide to legal thinking" 2 0 and urges that it be sup-
planted by legal realism and certain principles of
natural law.21 Legal realism will be useful, he sug-
gests, because "[i]t aims to strip the law of its harm-
ful myths and fictions, such as that judges do not make
law.... ,22 Dugard emphasizes that, even within the
framework of parliamentary supremacy, judges are pre-
sented with alternative courses of action and that the
very presence of alternatives reflects the potential for
judicial initiatives. Judges do not have to sit by pas-
sively while the law is reduced to a mere tool of re-
pression; they can help reform the law by applying it in
ways that promote libertarian values. An emphasis upon
natural law principles is needed, Dugard argues, to re-
mind the South African legal community of the "intersec-
tion of law and legal values. '2 3 He calls upon lawyers
and judges to use natural law principles to restrain the
power of parliament. He urges them to recognize that
there is a level of repressiveness below which a law
ceases to be a law. Finally, he proposes the enactment of
an American-style Bill of Rights as an entrenched safe-
guard to basic individual liberties. As Dugard explains:
"Once law is seen as a purposeful mechanism for protecting
the individual and promoting enlightened reform, rather
than as a command from above to below, a Bill of Rights
becomes an obvious requirement." 2 4
Human Rights and the South African Legal Order is an
impressive indication of John Dugard's commitment to humane
values. A white South African lawyer and professor, Dugard
has distinguished himself as a critic of his government's
laws and the legal community that enforces them. His work
not only represents a scholarly venture but is itself a
political act: a brief of dissent.
As repression in South Africa has intensified,
scholars who have dared to publish probing critiques of the
apartheid regime have become increasingly prone to harass-
ment. In terms of legal scholarship, inquiry into the
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taboo subject "upon which the academic writes at his
peril. ''2 5 Professor Barend van Niekirk, an outstanding
dissident figure within the South African legal academic
community, has twice been prosecuted, once successfully,
for contempt of court. The successful prosecution was
based on an article 26 he wrote that demonstrated a wide-
spread belief among advocates that judges impose sen,
tences in a racially discriminatory manner, especially in
capital cases. The effect of even an unsuccessful prose-
cution was so chilling that there have been no further
inquiries of the sort initiated by Van Niekirk. Further-
more, private sanctions against dissident intellectuals
pose an additional threat to careers and even physical
safety. Under these conditions, critical scholarly
analysis of apartheid requires courage as well as the
usual demanding requisites of intellectual labor.
Nevertheless, without in the least belittling his
effort, it must be noted that Professor Dugard has cau-
tiously observed the limits within which the regime allows
white critics to roam.27 This care is undoubtedly due in
25. P. 301.
26. Van Niekirk, ..Hanged by the Neck Until You Are Dead, 86
S. Aft. L.J. 457 (1969), 87 S. Afr. L.J. 60 (1970).
27. Racial discrimination affects the regimets response to
dissent; white critics are handled with far more lenience than black
critics. Commenting on discriminatory practices in censorship,
novelist Nadine Gordimer observes:
When it comes to literature, and in particular
the literature of ideas, there has been
precious little tolerance to disguise the re-
pression. Tolerance has operated in one small
area only, and provides a curious half-light on
the psychology of white supremacy. Literature
by black South Africans has been successfully
wiped out by censorship and the banning of
individuals, at home and in exile. But white
writers have been permitted to deal, within
strict limits, with the disabilities, suffering,
hopes, dreams, even resentments of black people.
Are such writings perhaps tolerated because
they have upon them the gloss of proxy--in a
strange way, although they may indict white
supremacy, they can be claimed by it because they
speak for the black man, as white supremacy de-
cides for him how he shall live... ?
H. Adam, Modernizing Racial Domination: South Africa's Political
Dynamics 55-56 (1971) quoting Gordimer, Censorship and the Primary
Homeland) Reality, Jan. 1970, at 14.
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large part to personal, prudential considerations--a de-
sire to avoid banning, jail, or harassment. But his care
also reflects a larger, less self-interested purpose:
his aim effectively to advocate reform. Effectiveness,
in Dugard's view, entails disseminating persuasive argu-
ments in favor of reform to the present managers of the
legal machinery. Hence, Human Rights and the South Afri-
can Legal Order is "intended primarily for white South
Africans, and especially for white South African lawyers.
'" 2 8
Keenly aware of the demands and vulnerabilities of
his audience, Dugard employs various strategies to win
them over to his views. To convince his readers that re-
form is urgently needed, he describes in clear detail the
baneful effects of the regime's laws. But to win a hear-
ing from whites so that they will at least consider his
critique and proposals, Dugard advances his argument in
moderate, unthreatening tones. At points, Human Rights
and the South African Legal Order reads more like the
product of a gingerly diplomat than that of a dissident
intellectual. Characteristic of Dugard's caution, his
insistence on appearing balanced, is a statement he makes
concerning academics in the legal community: "Sometimes,
cowed by executive and judicial disapproval, they have
failed to speak out ... and sometimes, angered by the
enormities of recent legislative inroads upon the basic
freedoms, they have spoken out too loudly" against the
barbarities of apartheid.2 9 What Dugard means to suggest
is not that loud protest is incommensurate with its pro-
vocation but only that strident protest is impolitic in-
sofar as it may alienate some who might be susceptible to
gentler persuasion.
In addition to moderating his rhetoric, Dugard re-
sorts to other strategies aimed at making his book more
widely acceptable. He divests it, for instance, of expli-
cit signs of political partisanship and affects as much as
possible the neutral, depersonalized stance characteristic
of most academic writers. Taken as a whole, Human Rights
and the South African Legal Order is clearly an indictment
of apartheid and its laws. Yet Dugard writes in its pre-
face that his purpose "is not to judge, but to describe
and explain. ,,3D
Another of Dugard's strategies is to fasten upon in-
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of a significant number of white South Africans. The
existence of this insecurity is reflected by the South
African government's insistence upon reminding its white
citizens of the kinship that exists between their insti-
tutions and those of the other white-dominated nations
of the world. In 1977, for instance, in a speech to the
Parliament, the Minister of Justice asserted: "Our legal
system is held in high esteem in all Western countries."'3
1
Dugard unmasks this self-congratulatory perception and
shows it to be a mere self-delusion. "South Africa's
legal system has become," he declares, "more of a rarity
in a world increasingly committed to the protection of
human rights by legal means."'3 2 Dugard's debunking of
the white's self-image is accompanied, though, by an im-
plicit affirmation that at its essential core, South
Africa's legal system aspires to embody certain Western
ideals regarding justice and the rule of law:
The legal values and principles that
should be employed to guide judicial
policy . . . are those jural postu-
lates that form part of the South
African legal heritage and are designed
to foster the basic political and
legal ideal of modern Western society --
the well-being and free development of
the individual. 33
He thus claims humane values as the heart of South Africa's
legal tradition, while excoriating apartheid's "statutory
injustices" as an odious departure .5R He flatters his
readers, recalling the finer moments of their legal heri-
tage, as he criticizes them. He attempts to use the spur
of pride and the whip of scorn to move them to reconsider
their positions as agents and beneficiaries of oppression.
Dugard also tries to claim his audience's attention
by appealing to their interest in a stable legal-political
system. For in addition to his libertarian argument
against repression, he criticizes repression on the ground
that in the long run it is ineffective in maintaining order.




34. The phrase "statutory injustices" is borrowed from Gustav
Radbruch, who used it to describe the laws of Nazi Germany. See p. 399.
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He warns, for instance, that denying freedom of assembly
is "highly dange'rous," for "when groups operating outside
the confines of recognized political parties are denied
the right of public protest it is not unlikely that they
will resort to clandestine political activities aimed at
the structure of society.'"35 Similarly, when criticizing
the special procedural rules governing trials involving
the security laws--shifting the onus of proof to defen-
dants, abolishing the rule prohibiting double jeopardy,
withdrawing the right to pre-trial hearings, allowing the
prosecution to split charges, arranging for pro-govern-
ment judges to hear political cases--Dugard focuses main-
ly on the ways in which these procedures "undermine the
value of the political trial as a process of judicial
authentication."3 6 He writes, for instance, that:
Inevitably there will be some skepti-
cism on the part of the public regard-
ing the political trial. For this
reason a government should remove all
suspicions of trial 'rigging' by en-
suring that there is no relaxation of
the procedural standards of fairness
required in ordinary criminal proceed-
ings. It should heed the warning ...
that 'since the violation of procedural
guarantees is visible to all, the image-
creating purposes of the proceedings are
jeopardized' by any tampering with the
rules of due process.3 7
Dugard sacrifices much to advance these and other
strategies of persuasion. Indeed, his sacrifices vitiate
much of the worth of Human Rights and the South African
Legal Order. For example, his argument for reforming the
procedural aspects of the security laws sacrifices the
essential demand that these laws be abolished. This is
not to suggest that the procedural rules governing repres-
sive legislation should be considered irrelevant by oppo-
nents of the regime. Inasmuch as procedural rules impose
some limitation on state power they should be used and ex-
tended as fully as possible--provided that reforms of this
type do not obscure the ultimate goal: to overthrow white
supremacy. While it is true that the extension of proce-
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and its courts, it is also true that stronger procedural
protections may serve to impede repression and thus pre-
serve resources--i.e., the lives of dissidents--needed to
destroy apartheid. 38
Dugard, however, does not advance his argument on
the basis that reform might contribute to the overthrow
of the regime. Rather he suggests that reforms are needed
in order to enhance "the image-creating purposes" of
trials. This suggestion would be -unsurprising if it came
from a defender of the regime searching for more sophis-
ticated methods with which to effect and legitimate re-
pression. It is disturbing that it comes from a leading
scholarly critic of the regime. Dugard's suggestion
evinces more concern with image than substance. Moder-
ating or even eliminating the openly one-sided procedural
rules governing political trials will add nothing in the
way of real fairness; it will simply make these trials
seem more fair. Completely missing from Dugard's analysis
is a recognition that there can be no such thing as a fair
trial in any case founded upon the laws of apartheid.
What Gustav Radbruch stated with regard to the laws of
nazism is equally applicable to the laws of apartheid:
"Where justice is not even an aim, where equality which
forms the crux of justice is consciously ignored in the
administration of justice, there the law does not merely
constitute 'wrong law' but lacks rather entirely the
quality of law."' 9
The overall thrust of Dugard's work--its insistent
demand that the government recognize basic individual
rights--makes it highly unlikely that he actually believes
in the program he posits: legitimating the established
order by making it merely appear more fair. Rather, as
has been indicated above, his willingness to frame his
arguments in a manner supportive of conservative purposes
is probably a ruse to allow his proposals for reform to
have currency among white South African readers. Accommo-
dations of this sort befit the calculations of a politician,
38. For a sensitive discussion of the dilemmas confronting
dissident lawyers who seek to work witbin the South African legal
order without helping to legitimate it, see S. Kentridge, The Pathol-
ogy of A Legal System: Criminal Justice in South Africa, 128 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 603, 619-21 (1980).
39. Van Niekerk, The Warning Voice from Heidelberg--The Life
and Thought of Gustav Radbruch, 90 S. Afr. L.J. 234, 234 (1973).
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not the responsibility of an intellectual. The intel-
lectual's role imposes a unique obligation "to speak the
truth and expose lies." 4 0 Dugard's willingness to make
statements that are misleading, and that do not reflect
his own actual beliefs, represents a misguided evasion of
this obligation. He exchanges the one real power an in-
tellectual does possess--his power to tell the full, un-
inhibited, radical truth--for the vision of exercising
influence, a seductive but illusory goal.
Another problem with Dugard's analysis is its tend-
ency to avoid certain key issues and to obfuscate others.
This tendency is both caused by his strategies of persua-
sion and used as a strategy itself. Persuasion presup-
poses the existence of some common ground, some shared
premises. Dugard apparently believes that a small area
of fragile consensus exists within South Africa's legal
community, an area where it may be possible for opponents
and defenders of the regime to begin some form of dialogue
in the hope of promoting reform. Preserving consensus en-
tails ignoring certain issues which raise irreconcilable
differences. Dugard thus intentionally avoids discussing
the ability of legal processes to destroy South Africa's
pigmentocracy, to create black majority rule and to redis-
tribute economic resources. Instead he merely asserts,
"1F]or anyone who believes that a peaceful resolution of
the South African race issue is still possible," reforms
in the legal system could forestall "the grim prospect" of
violent revolution.41 The key issue, however, is not whe-
ther a reformed legal system can forestall revolution but
whether it can radically alter power relationships so that
blacks will no longer be forced to slave as powerless
serfs for the benefit of the white minority.
Dugard advances his argument regarding the efficacy
of legal process by drawing upon an historical analogy
between the Republic of South Africa and the southern
United States during the segregation era, an analogy popu-
lar among liberals in both countries. The experience of
the southern United States attests, so the argument runs,
to the power of law gradually to dissolve racial stratifi-
cation. At least two problems erode Dugard's argument.
40. Chomsky, The Responsibility of Intellectuals, in American
Power and the New American Madarins 325 (1969).
41. P. 400.
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rn the first place, the United States has been far less
successful in erasing racial subjugation than Dugardts
argument implies. Anti-discrimination statutes and a
reform-minded judiciary have helped to create substantial
changes in race relations; discrimination in the public
sector and in many areas of the private sector is legally
prohibited. Nonetheless, it is clear from casual obser-
vation, not to mention statistical indicators of social
status, that in many crucial respects American blacks
continue to be victimized by racial oppression. A second
error in viewing the United States as a model is that the
differences between the racial situation here and in the
Republic of South Africa overwhelm the similarities. The
decisive dissimilarity is that in South Africa the whites
are outnumbered five to one; in the southern United
States the figures are exactly the opposite. Granting
civil rights, including the right to vote, to blacks in
the United States involves a far less sweeping redistribu-
tion of power than would be the parallel case in South
Africa. Whites in the United States could afford to
grant civil rights to blacks, for even when fully enfran-
chised the black minority poses no actual threat to the
overall ascendancy of whites in the United States. Simi-
lar developments in South Africa, however, would mean the
overthrow of white hegemony. The white minority, of
course, will not allow legal processes to effect a redis-
tribution of political power that would seriously threaten
their place at the top of the social pyramid.42 Dugard
himself acknowledges this. "White South Africans," he
notes, "have shown a deep resistance to change and there
is little likelihood of a voluntary surrender of power .... 43
On the other side, there is little likelihood that blacks
will voluntarily surrender their claims to majority rule.
That being the situation, Dugard's search for consensus
and faith in legal processes is woefully misplaced. For as
Judge Learned Hand once warned: "A society so riven that
the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save."'44
Nor should the Republic of South Africa as it is
presently constituted be saved. Human Rights and the South
African Legal Order shows why the apartheid regime deserves
destruction; the descriptive material in the book amply
supports the case for revolution. However, the book's pre-
scriptive element shrinks from that alternative. The dis-
42. For an excellent critique of the United States-Republic of
South Africa analogy, see Frederickson, South Africa and the American
South, Inquiry Magazine, Nov. 21, 1977, at 14-16.
43. P. 402.
44. Pp. 387-88, quoting L. Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 164 (1960).
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crepancy between description and prescription is partly
attributable to the prudential and strategic considera-
tions outlined above. But this jarring contrast is
also due to Dugard's paradoxical position as an opponent
of a pigmentocracy that benefits the race to which he
belongs. Deeply critical of the South African legal
order, he is still attached to it. He has not escaped
from what sociologist Robert Blauner has called, in a
different context, "the iron law of white privilege.
't4 5
One telling sign of Dugard's entrapment is the con-
stricted nature of even his boldest reformist vision:
If faith is to be restored in the South
African legal system while there is- yet
time sweeping changes will need to be made
to the entire edifice of the law. A new
Constitution with a Bill of Rights to
provide legal safeguards for individual
liberty, anti-discrimination laws , . .
and a concerned and courageous legal
profession committed to the enforcement
of human rights, are the very minimum
requirements. 46
This program insufficiently challenges white supremacy.
A new Constitution providing for the full enfranchisement
of blacks would pose a serious challenge. Yet Dugard is
silent on the question of black political power. Instead
he focuses on the protection of individual liberties,
neglecting the crucial fact that the struggle in South
Africa is over group rights.
Another telling sign of his entrapment is his insis-
tence upon forestalling the "grim prospect" of violent
revolution. 47 This indicates Dugard's inadequate sensi-
tivity to the immediate suffering of black South Africans.
For them, racial warfare is not a grim prospect but a
present reality. An intensification of their struggle for
power will shift the burden of this ongoing war onto the
white population. Heightened conflict does not signal the
unmitigated catastrophe Dugard seems willing to avoid at
all costs. To the contrary, it offers the possibility for
the creation of a truly democratic Azanian republic.4
45. R. Blauner, Racial Oppression in America 23 C1972).
46. P. 402 (emphasis in original).
47. P. 400.
48. Azania is the name used by revolutionaries in the anti-
apartheid movement to refer to a future South Africa, governed by
majority rule.
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With all its contradictions and evasions, Human
Rights and the South African Legal Order is itself an
artifact of apartheid. Viewing the book as an artifact,
as a reflection of the politics of South African legal
scholarship, allows one to glimpse the dilemmas plaguing
white dissident scholars. However much Dugardts work tells
us about the laws of apartheid, it also tells us much about
the agonizing ambivalences of a South African liberal as he
contemplates the crimes of his fellow white countrymen.

